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Order independence for iterated weak dominance

Marx, Leslie M.; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1993 - [Überarb.]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000920411

Order independence for iterated weak dominance

Marx, Leslie M.; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000920412

Order independence for iterated weak dominance

Marx, Leslie M.; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1996 - [Rev.]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000949476

Evolution and strategic stability : from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens

Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Journal of economic theory 57 (1992) 2, pp. 333-342

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001330383

Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants

Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Journal of economic theory 57 (1992) 2, pp. 306-332

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001330384

Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games

Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Games and economic behavior 5 (1993) 3, pp. 455-484

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001339744

Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance

Marx, Leslie M. - In: Games and economic behavior 26 (1999) 2, pp. 253-278.-1999,February=Vol.26,Nr.2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001363869

The simple geometry of perfect information games

Demichelis, Stefano; Ritzberger, Klaus; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 2002

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292784

How proper is sequential equilibrium?

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1995 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000896397

Structural indifference in normal form games

Mailath, George J. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000858557