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This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269906
explore whether central bank cheap talk, policy transparency, both cheap talk and policy transparency or economic transparency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114
A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241003
A decision maker (DM) must address a series of problems over time. Each period, a random case arises and the DM must make a yes-or-no decision, which we call a ruling. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until she conducts a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824214
the probability of inefficient default, the regulator optimally designs a disclosure regime that imposes transparency when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351306
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
public instead of denying access to public information. -- transparency ; private information ; common knowledge …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747918
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other public actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103059
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529
This study examines monetary policy and central bank communication when a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much of this information it releases to the public....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930476