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In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702278
We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012797563
In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301815
In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003636427
We study the potential role of correlated refinancing abilities among di.erent countries for the disruption of government bond markets in a currency union. Following Morris and Shin (2004) we use a global games framework and model the simultaneous investment decision into two assets, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011495734
We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897901
We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such "cursed" traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage distortions caused...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928331
In our experimental setting, participants face the decision to invest into two assets which are subject to correlated information. While fundamental states and signals about fundamental states are correlated, success and default of the investment projects is determined separately. Nevertheless,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011719838
We solve and test experimentally a global-games model of speculative attacks where agents can choose whether to read, at a cost, a payoff irrelevant (sunspot) announcement. Assuming that subjects exogenously believe some others to follow sunspots, we provide conditions for a unique equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976078
We consider the general problem of a set of agents trading a portfolio of assets in the presence of transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs and we study, with analytical and numerical methods, the resulting Nash equilibria. Extending significantly the framework of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837608