We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender's preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self-serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender's benefits from communication, assess...

This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...

We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the optimal policy features hype cycles: the sender first exaggerates the value of a technology to attract the adopter,...

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...

This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the 'value of information' for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a...

This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and second-mover advantages in a unified framework....

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor's product-market...

Timing of market entry is one of the most important strategic decisions a firm must make, but its decision process becomes convoluted with information and payoff spillovers. The threat of competition pushes firms to enter earlier to preempt their rivals while the possibility of learning make...

This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We...