We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better informationabout the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder'sinformation is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed.We show that withholding information creates a...

In this short note, we show investors one way to calculate ideal investment sizing by using two rules of thumb based on a simple outline of individual risk aversion. We illustrate these two heuristics, which are not widely appreciated, with thought experiments involving coin flips and ketchup &...

This study examines two determinants of investor sentiment (ex-ante evaluation of future value-related events and ex-post reaction to event outcomes) using the data on soccer games and betting odds. Results suggest that the magnitude and the character of investor reactions vary considerably...

We study strategic disclosure timing by correlated firms in the presence of risk-averse investors. Firms delay disclosures in the hope that positively correlated firms will announce especially good news and lift their own price. Risk premia rise before disclosures, drop when disclosures occur,...

This study examines the role of differences in firms' propensity to meet earnings expectations in explaining why firms with high analyst forecast dispersion experience relatively low future stock returns. We first demonstrate that the negative relation between dispersion and returns is...