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, theory even predicts that strategic interaction forces firms to set the market clearing price. For society, this would be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116
We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003751880
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted standing to sue for recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to intermediaries lower in the chain of production and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343268
that expanding rights of action has on leniency applications, this Article employs a game-theory model first created by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259781
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
, theory even predicts that strategic interaction forces firms to set the market clearing price. For society, this would be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205721
We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from the firms under complete information. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895170
As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508060
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433900
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378956