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This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001782511
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
To help incorporate natural language into economic theory, this paper does two things. First, the paper extends to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346272
This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115983
Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in direct mechanisms. We introduce two new notions of robust implementation based on the premise that society may be composed of "primitive'' agents who, whenever confronted with a strategy profile, anchor to truthtelling and make a limited number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951989
We propose a belief-based theory for private information games. A Bk player forms correct beliefs up to the k …, as in standard game theory. Heuristic beliefs ignore the distribution of types and are rather heuristic projections of … version of the game, where the entire hierarchy of beliefs is heuristic. We ground the belief-based theory on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901411