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After the Storm : Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Examination of the 'Minnesota Model' for National Regulation of Mortgage Brokers and Tomorrow's Predatory Lenders

Ireland, Mark - 2012

information and game theory. Specifically, how the regulatory failures resulted in mortgage brokers and lenders that were not … to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day …-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship with consumers. This article identifies the three regulatory and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708

Strategic complementarity, fragility, and regulation

Vives, Xavier - 2011 - Rev. May 2011

The paper analyzes a very stylized model of crises and demonstrates how the degree of strategic complementarity in the actions of investors is a critical determinant of fragility. It is shown how the balance sheet composition of a financial intermediary, parameters of the information structure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230899

Game theory : parts I and II with 88 solved exercises : an open access textbook

Bonanno, Giacomo - 2015

This is a draft of the first half of an open access textbook on game theory. I hope to complete the entire book by the … end of 2015. After teaching game theory (at both the undergraduate and graduate level) at the University of California … theory and there is hardly any need for a new one. However, there are two distinguishing features of this textbook: (1) it is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429960

Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation

Vives, Xavier - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119315

Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation

Vives, Xavier - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092690

Strategic default in financial networks

Allouch, Nizar; Jalloul, Maya; Duncan, Alfred - 2021

This paper investigates a model of default in financial networks where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default. Agents' payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced in the seminal contribution of Eisenberg and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655559