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Citizen-editors' endogenous information acquisition and news accuracy

Sobbrio, Francesco - 2013 - This version: October, 2013

This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774121

Disclosure of information under competition : an experimental study

Sheth, Jesal Dilip - 2019

-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition … examine whether receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information decreases with competition between senders. We find that … complete unravelling fails to occur without competition. However, with competition, there is significantly higher unravelling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603

Common Agency with Informed Principals : Menus and Signals

Galperti, Simone - 2015

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126

Optimal refund mechanism

Lyu, Qianjun - 2022

This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation over time. In principle, a refund mechanism can specify the odds that the seller requires the product returned while issuing a (partial) refund, which we call stochastic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493000

Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals

Galperti, Simone - 2011

I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226

Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662

Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619

Dynamic Contracting Under Imperfect Public Information and Asymmetric Beliefs

Giat, Yahel - 2013

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters, agency conflicts, and the agent's implicit incentives to influence the principal's posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095153