This article proposes a two-stage oligopoly model for the crude oil market. In a game of several Stackelberg leaders, market power increases endogenously as the spare capacity of the competitive fringe goes down. This effect is due to the specific cost function characteristics of extractive...

This article proposes a two-stage oligopoly model for the crude oil market. In a game of several Stackelberg leaders, market power increases endogenously as the spare capacity of the competitive fringe goes down. This effect is due to the specific cost function characteristics of extractive...

A model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by OPEC countries. Writing out the shadow price on quota allocations so as to draw correspondence to coefficients of cooperation (Cyert et al. 1973), we examine the incentives that different OPEC members to collude. We find that...

By making use of coefficients of cooperation [8] in a global oil model where OPEC producers are the dominant players and non-OPEC is the competitive fringe, we ask whether OPEC producers have strong incentives for imperfect collusion. First, assuming that OPEC members withhold supply only when...

Significant advances have now occurred in the theoretical and in the empirical knowledge-base of researchers studying problems in natural resource and environmental economics. This has been accompanied by the utilization of many and varied research tools. These developments notwithstanding,...

Significant advances have now occurred in the theoretical and in the empirical knowledge-base of researchers studying problems in natural resource and environmental economics. This has been accompanied by the utilization of many and varied research tools. These developments notwithstanding,...

This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible reasons for the lack of empirical support for the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are large enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component...

The paper presents a model of world economy with two countries where one of them dubbed home sells the exhaustible resource to final producers in both countries, which compete at the final goods market. The interaction between final producers is reached via the sticky price mechanics, whereas...