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Khezr, Peyman; Menezes, Flávio Marques - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 47 (2018) 4, pp. 1329-1350

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010898

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions

Jewitt, Ian; Li, Daniel Z. - 2021

This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400

Corporate lobbying : a review of the recent literature

Gregor, Martin - 2011

This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions --- contestsfor policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models --- are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying arepresented in the context of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009316408

Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2012

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009632293

A Strong Minimax Theorem for Informationally-Robust Auction Design

Brooks, Benjamin - 2020

We study the design of profit-maximizing mechanisms in environments with interdependent values. A single unit of a good is for sale. There is a known joint distribution of the bidders' ex post values for the good. Two programs are considered:(i) Maximize over mechanisms the minimum over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826866