conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy … information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality. The impact of the first … little weight on private information. We find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very …

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously … in information). The reason is that the market in general does not internalize the informational externality when public … statistics (e.g., prices) convey information. Under strategic substitutability, equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little …

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously … in information). The reason is that the market in general does not internalize the informational externality when public … statistics (e.g., prices) convey information. Under strategic substitutability, equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his informal referrals remain high. The principal finds it optimal to under-utilize information if she uses …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …