how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game … investor of the group bears the costs of investment while everyone in the group benefits if the project reveals high returns … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …

investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a nonrival project with uncertain returns. The earliest investor bears the … costs of investment and all players learn whether the project is of good or bad quality. Informational externalities create … free-riding incentives resulting in strategic delays in investment timings. Our theoretical analysis suggests that …

This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for …

We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private … generates an incentive for "alarmism", the exaggeration of social returns in order to opportunistically induce more investment …