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Information design in coalition formation games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867

Implementation with Strategic Private Information

Koch, Caleb M. - 2019

This paper studies implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is not guaranteed to be truthful because of strategic actions. We thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106692

Information and Interaction

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash equilibrium for a class of one dimensional signals. It is then shown that this class of one dimensional signals provide a comprehensive description of the first and second moments of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894

Common Agency with Informed Principals : Menus and Signals

Galperti, Simone - 2015

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126

Cheap Talk with Correlated Information

Chand, A.K.S. - 2016

We consider a situation where a decision maker gathers information from two or more imperfectly informed experts. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987832

Receiver's Sensitivity and Strategic Information Transmission in Multi-sender Cheap Talk

Ogawa, Hiromasa - 2018

This study examines how sensitivity, which is defined as the degree to which a decision maker (DM) incorporates experts' opinions into his/her own decision-making, affects the precision of communication with experts when communication is strategic. We develop a simple cheap talk model comprising...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910890

On the Bright Side of Correlation Information Transmission

Battaggion, Maria Rosa; Karakoç, Gülen - 2022

We consider a situation in which a decision maker solicits information from two partially informed experts with uncertain biases. Experts’ private information about an underlying state might be conditionally correlated across them. We show that although correlation tightens the conditions on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014236650

Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals

Galperti, Simone - 2011

I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085