information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …

integrated with climate dynamics, a grand climate coalition or multiple climate coalitions may form in equilibrium, but if the …

This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups … settings. Efficiency gains are said to be generated if any coalition experiences increasing marginal returns with aggregate … a sequential coalition formation game for an arbitrary number of symmetric players and exogenous effort. If coalitions …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …