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Consensus-halving via theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker
Simmons, Forest W.; Su, Francis Edward - 2001 - Manuscript version, February 2001
In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569033
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Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand
Brunner, Johann K.; Pech, Susanne - 2002
that different risk-groups prefer different types of contracts, and that only the sequential contracts, which are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541030
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Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand
Brunner, Johann K.; Pech, Susanne - 2002 - Revised Version
two periods can be decided either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009750235
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Adverse selection in the annuity market when payoffs vary over the time of retirement
Brunner, Johann K.; Pech, Susanne - 2000 - Revised Version
This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection and price competition on the private annuity market in a model with two retirement periods. In this framework annuity companies can offer contracts with different payoffs over the periods of retirement. Varying the time structure of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009750561
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Robust Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Investment-Reinsurance Game
Pun, Chi Seng - 2017
concerns. Each AAI invests in a risky asset and a risk-free asset, and manages her own risks by purchasing reinsurance with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969836
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Stackelberg Differential Game for Insurance Under Model Ambiguity
Cao, Jingyi; Li, Dongchen; Young, V.R; Zou, Bin - 2022
We study a dynamic Stackelberg differential game between a buyer and a seller of insurance policies in a spectrally negative Lévy framework, in which both parties are ambiguous about the intensity and severity of insurable losses. Both the buyer and seller aim to maximize their expected wealth,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307577
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Competitive Insurance Pricing Strategies for Multiple Lines of Business : A Game Theoretic Approach
Mourdoukoutas, Fotios; Pantelous, Athanasios A.; … - 2022
. We consider the collective risk model to define the aggregate loss faced by insurers, with claim amounts being …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295410
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Solution algorithm
Sarfati, Mahir; Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza; Holmberg, Pär - 2018
In part I of this paper, we proposed a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) to analyze imperfect competition of oligopoly producers in two-stage zonal power markets. In part II of this paper, we propose a solution algorithm which decomposes the proposed MILP model into several subproblems and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943407
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A Game Theoretic Approach to Analyse Cooperation Between Rural Households in Northern Nigeria
Gerichhausen, Marloes - 2008
programming and cooperative game theory. While linear programming establishes insight in optimal farm plans for farmers that … cooperate, game theory is used to generate fair divisions of the extra gain that is established by cooperation.The model is … the individual gross margins. To divide these gains, we consider four established solution concepts from game theory that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723805
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Feedback Nash Equilibria for Linear Quadratic Descriptor Differential Games
Engwerda, Jacob C.; Salmah - 2010
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192996