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Who Do You Want to Talk to? Theory and Experiment of Network Formation under Strategic Information Transmission

Meng, Delong; Wang, Siyu - 2022

We combine network formation and information transmission in a simple model and predict that people reveal less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079960

Endogenous public information and welfare

Vives, Xavier - 2011

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832

Endogenous public information and welfare

Vives, Xavier - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259934

Smooth, strategic communication : conference paper

Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezsö - 2014

We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482440

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Golosov, Mikhail - 2011

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124963

Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games

Vives, Xavier - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600

Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games

Vives, Xavier - 2015

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011001

Noisy talk

Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 395-440

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately … their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic … dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning

Pei, Harry - 2019

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players' actions. First, when the long-run player's action can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393

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