In this short note, we show investors one way to calculate ideal investment sizing by using two rules of thumb based on a simple outline of individual risk aversion. We illustrate these two heuristics, which are not widely appreciated, with thought experiments involving coin flips and ketchup &...

This study examines two determinants of investor sentiment (ex-ante evaluation of future value-related events and ex-post reaction to event outcomes) using the data on soccer games and betting odds. Results suggest that the magnitude and the character of investor reactions vary considerably...

We study strategic disclosure timing by correlated firms in the presence of risk-averse investors. Firms delay disclosures in the hope that positively correlated firms will announce especially good news and lift their own price. Risk premia rise before disclosures, drop when disclosures occur,...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to...

We study a strategic market game with finitely many traders, infinite horizon and real assets. To this standard framework (see, e.g. Giraud and Weyers, 2004) we add two key ingredients: First, default is allowed at equilibrium by means of some collateral requirement for financial assets; second,...

We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...

We analyze how public disclosure of informed investors' trades results in manipulation, which in turn affects coordination and competition in a duopolistic setting. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profit is ambiguous. When informed...

We study a unique Chinese dataset of equity analysts' on-site visits to publicly listed companies. We find that analyst silence (no release of report from visit date to the next quarterly earnings announcement) contains information that negatively impacts both stock returns and earnings...