Building on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economy in the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paper analyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the central bank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multipliereffects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state and only a fraction of all agents...

This paper derives the equilibrium Nash strategies of two central banks for economies related by trade. Both policy makers seek to stabilize inflation and output but are constrained by their economies' interactions. Into this mix is added the further assumption of Knightian uncertainty regarding...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...