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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - 2005

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366554

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

Cournot Competition with an Uncertain Number of Players : Experimental Evidence

Möllers, Claudia; Normann, Hans-Theo; Odenkirchen, … - 2022

We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies when there is uncertainty about the number of players. Already in the static game, such uncertainty can imply outputs above Nash. For the repeated game, we argue that the uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy, based on a notion of limited depth of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077530

Strategic disclosure of demand information by duopolists : theory and experiment

Jansen, Jos; Pollak, Andreas - 2015

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237

Duopoly Competition, Escape Dynamics and Non-Cooperative Collusion

Janjgava, Batlome - 2012

In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984 … cooperative motives. In contrast to Green and Porter (1984), our results show that in a model with learning, breakdown of a cartel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113984

Equilibria in a Japanese-English auction with discrete bid levels for the wallet game

Silva, Ricardo Gonçalves; Ray, Indrajit - 2016

We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for the wallet game with two bidders. We prove that bidding twice the signal - the equilibrium strategy with continuous bid levels - is never an equilibrium in this set up. We show that partition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688790

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 705-742

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576711

The Private Value Single Item Bisection Auction

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Grigorieva, Elena; Muller, … - 2003

In this paper we present a new iterative acution, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014095794