This paper delves into the effects that strategic representations have on firm performance. It does so in four ways. First, it describes different types of representations—internal, external, and distributed—and it points to their pervasiveness in strategy. Second, it presents a framework to...

We introduce a model of product development in a firm. Our model describes the process as a multi-stage contest (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers from the new product using the normatively appealing Nash...

The paper analyzes how spillovers in the product market affect the incentives of firms to reveal information about their innovative productivity. Such spillovers create a free-rider effect in the patent race that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. The equilibrium disclosure...

An innovative firm chooses strategically whether to patent its process innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rival’s beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. Different measures of competitive pressure in the product...

An innovative firm chooses strategically whether to patent its process innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rival's beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. Different measures of competitive pressure in the product...

In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden ausgewählte Probleme, die im Zusammenhang mit der Subventionierung von erneuerbarer Energien stehen, in finanztheoretischen und industrieökonomischen Modellen formal analysiert. Der erste Teil der Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Subventionierung von...

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb from other firms is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g., firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an...