The article examines the firm's choice of incentives when workers face additional incentives (external incentives) to those provided by the firm, such as building reputation that improves the workers' prospects with other employers, or satisfaction from working well. Surprisingly, the firm might...

We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an "inspection game" where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects...

This paper introduces a relative performance prize scheme to best-of-N contests. We develop a theoretical model of the best-of-N contest with intermediate prizes distributed based on the players' relative performance. The model predicts that a relative performance prize scheme both increases the...

We analyze the strategic allocation of resources across two contests as in the canonical Colonel Blotto game. In the games we study, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across two fields of battle. The larger force on each battlefield wins that battle, and the payoff to a player is...

Consumer boycotts are commonly used by citizens protesting against unfair environmental, social, or health practices by firms. Game theory offers simple tools to analyze the impact and the potential for success of such actions. Consumer boycotts may be viewed as a war of attrition between a...

We analyze a coordination game characterised by varying degrees of conflict of interest, incentive to coordinate and information asymmetry. The primary objective is to question whether endogenous leadership better enables coordination. A secondary objective is to question whether preference and...

We analyze a coordination game characterised by varying degrees of conflict of interest, incentive to coordinate and information asymmetry. The primary objective is to question whether endogenous leadership better enables coordination. A secondary objective is to question whether preference and...

The n total consumers in the market for a particular good are made up of b brown and g green consumers so that b g=n. The b brown (g green) consumers are not (are) environmentally conscious and hence they prefer to buy a new (remanufactured) good denoted by N and R respectively. By strategically...

The n total consumers in the market for a particular good are made up of b brown and g green consumers so that b g=n. The b brown (g green) consumers are not (are) environmentally conscious and hence they prefer to buy a new (remanufactured) good denoted by N and R respectively. By strategically...

In human societies, overcoming incentives to act selfishly is immensely important so as to promote prosocial behaviours. Social norms and relational utility, utility generated by such feelings as guilt, are mechanisms by which cooperation and coordination can be facilitated. Here we add...