Showing 1 - 10 of 3,318
We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of … rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost …-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432306
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private domestic or foreign firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343823
deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated by males and females when hustling (encouraging entry) is … salient perturbations, we propose a strategic foundation of overconfidence. Since overconfident statements are used in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223063
We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705463
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) intends to create the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a single market, to be completed by 2020. The single market will boost the competition in both ASEAN's internal and external markets, which will spur innovation. Creative innovation will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061529
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277464
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277509
In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514799
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316023