-assessments can be detrimental to workers' performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our … workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the … team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with …

role in determining the behavior of their counterparts. In our experiment, only the trustee is aware of the size of the …'s behavior and risk attitude are also elicited in the experiment. Our results show that the first movers' choices are functions …

context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on …

choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …

choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …

shift responsibility to, like the leader in our three person game. -- Team production ; Trust ; Principal Agent ; Guilt … ; Guilt alleviation ; Conformity ; False consensus effect ; Lab experiment ; Cherry picking …