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; strategic substitutability ; wage contracts ; contract duration …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982016
; strategic substitutability ; wage contracts ; contract duration …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983623
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793109
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008937818
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269942
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270522
Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472
In three experiments, we examine how an employer reputation system disciplines an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. These three experiments test the value of the employer reputation system for workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972193
This study investigates the structure of optimal incentives in a stochastic environment and provides evidence for the use of self-enforcing relational contracts. We show theoretically that under relational contracting, firms can credibly promise chief executive officers (CEOs) larger bonuses in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053561
The research success of a university requires efficient recruiting. The talents of candidates are unobservable for administrators, and so they delegate hiring to the faculty who have better knowledge of the job market. Since professors dislike putting their own employment at risk, faculty,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032126