Showing 1 - 10 of 1,554
Since Schelling's seminal work on bargaining, it has been a common intuition that two parties cannot form a contract … with positive expectation damages (let alone one that is renegotiation proof), if outside of the contract each would have … no interests in what the other would or could do. After all, how could a contract in of itself create an interest that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219928
Social preferences and formal contract enforcement are two mechanisms that facilitate performance of an agreement. The … hypothesis that social preferences and contract enforcement are complements. We measure social preferences from a standard Trust … Game and use it is an explanatory variable in a Contract Game. We find that both increased contract enforcement and high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050494
breach is efficient when performance of a contract generates a negative total surplus for the parties. However, by … different from loss-avoiding breaches. To capture these different motives, we designed a novel game called Contract-Breach Game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703333
We study the voting rules to modify, amend, and renegotiate syndicated loan contracts. We base our hypotheses on a model that shows how amendment thresholds can mitigate agency conflicts within the lending syndicate. Consistent with our model predictions, we find that voting rules are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212543
The judgments of English courts regularly state that the principles governing contract interpretation are well … more conservative approach to contract interpretation under which disputes should be resolved primarily on the basis of … finding that the language of the contract is unambiguous is a ruling that absurd consequences will result …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016661
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We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
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This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351
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