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Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310

Consulting collusive experts

Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi - In: Games and economic behavior 122 (2020), pp. 290-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430447

Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion

Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi - In: Journal of economic theory 208 (2023), pp. 1-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390597

Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach

Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2021

A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309

Delegation and communication

Arve, Malin; Honryo, Takakazu - 2015

This paper analyzes delegation and joint decision making in an environment with private information and partially aligned preferences. We compare the benefits of these two decision making procedures as well as the interaction between them. We give a condition under which delegation is preferred...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345755

Venture capital and asymmetric information

D'Souza, Patrick - 2001 - Als Ms. gedr.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001575163

Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2011

This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636

The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2014

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are … we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the … conditions for sustainability hold. We analyze how the maximal cartel price supported by different cartel strategies adjusts in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433900

Delegation and Information Revelation

Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2003

This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques a la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151717

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