where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect … and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study … coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining … concerned with the characterisation of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show that if the two workers are sufficiently complementary or if … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …