We construct explicit equilibria for strategic market games used to model an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably many time- periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of the commodity is a random variable that fluctuates from period to period. In each...

The classical Fisher equation asserts that in a nonstochastic economy, the inflation rate must equal the difference between the nominal and real interest rates. We extend this equation to a representative agent economy with real uncertainty in which the central bank sets the nominal rate of...

This paper derives the equilibrium Nash strategies of two central banks for economies related by trade. Both policy makers seek to stabilize inflation and output but are constrained by their economies' interactions. Into this mix is added the further assumption of Knightian uncertainty regarding...

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out undesired self-fulfilling expectations. We first show that, in a large class of...

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...

This paper investigates two different approaches to the analysis of institutions using game theory and discusses their methodological and theoretical implications for further research. Starting from von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory, we investigate, how Schotter and Schelling's approaches to...

In an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy, agents use fiat money to bridge markets as if they make trades in a centralized economy, to avoid huge transaction cost that all agents' going together must incur. The model in this paper formulates the process how agents decide the fiat...

This paper addresses firstly why people have to use fiat money and then why they are rationally willing to accept it from the perspective of general equilibrium by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of its purchasing power in unrevealed future. Its model formulates the process...

The challenge of rendering monetary exchange intelligible within a Walrasian general equilibrium framework is well known. Perhaps less well known is the difficulty of integrating monetary and exchange economies in decentralized conceptions of equilibrium, of which the evenly rotating economy of...

This paper studies a coordination game with incomplete information and the option to delay. The delay option enables the agents to observe a binary signal depending on whether the early actions (e.g., investment) surpasses a threshold. The anticipation of information incentivizes agents to wait...