Showing 1 - 10 of 17,732
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409263
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592755
policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013326522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409264
This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision … contributions by a strategic incentive to adopt lower technology to motivate coalition building by other nations, which in the end …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643560
non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325122
The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191875
Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044933