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Selecting the Best of Us? : politician quality in village councils in West Bengal, India
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Iversen, Vegard; Jensenius, Francesca R. - 2020
Who gets elected to political office? The negative selection hypothesis posits that the inherently dishonest run for office, expecting to earn political rent. Alternatively, the positive selection hypothesis suggests that individuals join politics to make a difference. Developing country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012294723
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Leniency policies and illegal transactions
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005
enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558
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The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620
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Whistle-blower protection : theory and experimental evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2017
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625350
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Whistle-blower protection : theory and experimental evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2017
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619649
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A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies
Dabla-Norris, Era - 2006
. Conditions under which lower-tier corruption arises as an equilibrium characterization of the game are identified. If … bureaucratic corruption sufficiently reduces the tax base, policies that deter corruption may be optimal. When monitoring is … expensive or ineffective, lower-level corruption arises as equilibrium. Tax farming and the sale of offices can occur in these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012782781
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2012
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2010
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301733
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game : an experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2010
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption …. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008654377
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Let them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence
Lambsdorff, Johann; Nell, Mathias - 2005
to disband the "pact of silence" characteristic of corrupt arrangements. -- Corruption ; Asymmetric Sanctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009424464