This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game … with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime … punishment regime). We employ a within-subjects design where subjects experience both environments and control for order effects …

of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly … will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination …: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as …

information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the …Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the … theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish …

cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where … antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing … punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as …

cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving … cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for …Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature …

-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that …

-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that …

irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is … cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to …