We consider the design of a repeated contest in the presence of a potentially biased judge. Beliefs about the judge’s bias may discourage contestants from exerting effort. In a repeated contest, the identity of a previous winner influences these beliefs. The contest designer is able to commit...

We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...

In a Bayesian persuasion setting, a sender persuades a receiver to take an action by designing and committing to disclose information about the receiver's payoff of taking the action. We propose a model that incorporates reciprocity into the Bayesian persuasion setting, using the approach of...

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium...