The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is … disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only …

nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is noisy, which removes common knowledge about …

We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some … combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We … communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show …

In this paper we study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and …(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G …

. -- Correlated equilibrium ; Communication equilibrium ; Incomplete information ; Bayesian games ; Mechanism ; Correlation device … (communication equilibrium). Thus, mechanisms can be classified by the connections between the messages that the players receive and … information the number is 14–15 for correlated equilibria and 15–17 for communication equilibria. Each class is characterized by …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …