This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...

This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...

We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash...

This study examines monetary policy and central bank communication when a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much of this information it releases to the public....

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than nonmembership. For example, entry into a monetary union may cause a move from a non-indexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage...