conditions for either compliance or exploitation to occur, but also sheds light on the transition from one form of government to …This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a …

Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided … government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party … discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the government's special interests are …

allows the derivation of conditions for either compliance or exploitation to occur and provides a comparative static … explanation for the transition from one form of government to the other. Thus, it contributes to Positive Constitutional Economics …

conditions for either compliance or exploitation to occur, but also sheds light on the transition from one form of government to …This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a …

trust. Finally, we find consistent evidence of peer effects: higher levels of peer compliance raise future compliance and … and social norms, and trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1,038), we find that biased institutions reduce … rule compliance compared to fair institutions. However, rule enforcement - fair and unfair - reduces norm polarisation …