Showing 1 - 10 of 978
update their beliefs about the probability of being audited, both before and after audits are definitely withdrawn. We find … that when individuals have initially experienced systematic audits, they decrease both their beliefs and their … irregular, they maintain high beliefs about the probability of being audited and continue cooperating long after audits have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239265
different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366185
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526
the prevalence of their own values and preferences when forming beliefs about others' values and preferences, depends on … the salience of own preferences. We manipulate salience by varying the order of elicitation of preferences and beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014233633
We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228760
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412685
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other public actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103059
We study committees that acquire information, deliberate and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898263
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769351
their beliefs about the analysts' type when the report is proven to be accurate. Therefore, both types of analysts will have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019964