In this paper, I seek to establish a framework in which solutions to imperfect recall decision problems can be suitably examined. I introduce a strategy concept which is an extension of the standard concept employed since von Neumann and Morgenstern, and show how it may provide optimal solutions...

In this paper, I study decision theory in the presence of imperfect recall. I use an extension of the standard strategy concept for the analysis of extensive form games in order to examine the range of imperfect recall problems for which there exists an optimal solution. Optimality is assessed...

We challenge the standard definition of economic rationality as consistency by making use of a novel distinction between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency...

This book presents recent findings and results concerning the solutions of especially finite state-space Markov decision problems and determining Nash equilibria for related stochastic games with average and total expected discounted reward payoffs. In addition, it focuses on a new class of...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...