Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Fiskalischer Föderalismus und Staatstätigkeit

Schaltegger, Christoph A. - In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 52 (2003) 1, pp. 84-110

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001755027

Do large cabinets favor large governments?: Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions

Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265723

Growth effects of public expenditure on the state and local level : evidence from a sample of rich governments

Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Torgler, Benno - In: Applied economics 38 (2006) 10, pp. 1181-1192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003336901

Decentralized taxation and the size of government : evidence from Swiss state and local governments

Feld, Lars P.; Kirchgässner, Gebhard; Schaltegger, … - In: Southern economic journal 77 (2010) 1, pp. 27-48

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729306

Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons

Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - In: Journal of public economics 93 (2009) 1/2, pp. 35-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826383

Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions

Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451337

Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions

Feld, Lars P.; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - 2004

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261274

Do large cabinets favor large governments? : Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions

Schaltegger, Christoph A. (contributor); … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003256805

Federalism and the size of government revisited : the role of the tax power

Feld, Lars P.; Kirchgässner, Gebhard; Schaltegger, … - In: Proceedings / 96th Annual Conference on Taxation : …, (pp. 144-151). 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002538652

Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions

Feld, Lars P.; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - 2021

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318954

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