We provide a model that allows for a transition between the simplest variation of two basic models of strategic network formation: Bala and Goyal's one-way flow model without decay, where links can be unilaterally formed, and a version without decay of Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model...

We study a connections model where the strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by an increasing strictly concave function. The revenue from investments in links is the value (information, contacts, friendship) that the nodes receive through the network. First,...

We provide a model that allows for a transition between the simplest variation of two basic models of strategic network formation: Bala and Goyal's one-way flow model without decay, where links can be unilaterally formed, and a version without decay of Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model...

We study a connections model where the strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by an increasing strictly concave function. The revenue from investments in links is the value (information, contacts, friendship) that the nodes receive through the network. First,...

We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability and efficiency in the “one-way flow” model of network formation. In this model the information that flows through a link between two players runs only towards the player that initiates and supports the link, so in order for it to...

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark game-theoretic models by Bala and Goyal (2000a) – the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model – and includes both as limiting cases. As in both the said models, a link can be initiated...