We consider a market where privately informed sellers resort to certification to overcome adverse selection. There is … U-shaped function of his reputation for accuracy: being perceived as more precise allows to attract more good sellers … but a high expected precision also deters bad sellers. Since the certifier tries to reach a balanced reputation to attract …

In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a … monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …

-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism. …This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in … the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most …

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have … strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …