We consider a Bayesian decision problem in which an agent must draw inferences about multiple unobserved variables. This problem appears in different economic settings, for instance in the theory of agency. Assume that both observed and unobserved variables are ordered. We say that the inference...

In this paper, we extend the stability notion and Bayesian efficiency notion of Liu (2020) to local ones, as well as his result—that under certain intuitive conditions, stable matchings are Bayesian efficient—to an analogous one for local notions. Furthermore, the extended stability notion,...

Why does misinformation persist, and how does it distort the long-run beliefs and actions of rational agents? We study a model where receivers see an infinite stream of messages from a sender of unknown type who observes private signals about an unknown state of the world. We characterize the...

School systems regularly use student assessments for accountability purposes. But, as highlighted by our conceptual model, different configurations of assessment usage generate performance-conducive incentives of different strengths for different stakeholders in different school environments. We...

We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the...