This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute...

In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The welfare criterion we employ is...

This note derives a model of the wage curve, closely following Phelps (1994) and Campbell and Orszag (1998). Phelps discusses a variety of theoretical bases for a wae curve, the two major competing types being bargaining models and efficiency wage models, though Phelps prefers the term...

We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning,...

We analyze the impact of tax morale on the optimal progressive labor income taxation. Only universal basic income is financed from a linear tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax...

Gender difference in taxation is generally understudied, especially in sociologyliterature, which often overlooks taxation as a social phenomenon.While a small literature, studies on gender and taxation from a wider range of disciplines have offered and tested some core mechanisms producing...

We use micro data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to document how households' tax liabilities vary with income, marital status and the number of dependents. We report facts on the distributions of average and marginal taxes, properties of the joint distributions of taxes paid and income,...

Promotions and cross-firm mobility provide substantial gains in earnings - a well established finding based on gross income data. Yet, what matters for incentives is how much an individual can consume or save after taxation. We show that net and gross income growth patterns may differ...

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a matching unemployment framework with endogenous (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse employment elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global...