We show that local potential maximizer (\cite{morris+05}) with constant weights is stochastically stable in the log-linear dynamics provided that the payoff function or the associated local potential function is supermodular. We illustrate and discuss, through a series of examples, the use of...

This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as...

In this paper, which is a continuation of the discrete time paper, we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game theoretic...

We propose a learning dynamic with agents using samples of past play to estimate the distribution of other players' strategy choices and best responding to this estimate. To account for noisy play, estimated distributions over other players' strategy choices have full support in the other...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information about the value of a privately-informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We characterize the unique equilibrium in a continuous-time framework. The equilibrium involves periods of no trade or market failure....

We consider the long-run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory. We extend the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993) to a two-stage Nash demand game. Two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the Nash...

Brenner and Vriend (2006) argued (experimentally and theoretically) that one should not expect proposers in ultimatum games to learn to converge to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer, as finding the optimal offer is a hard learning problem for (boundedly-rational) proposers. In this...

In this paper, which is a continuation of a previous discrete time paper, we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game...