I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent.s type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...

We show that local potential maximizer (\cite{morris+05}) with constant weights is stochastically stable in the log-linear dynamics provided that the payoff function or the associated local potential function is supermodular. We illustrate and discuss, through a series of examples, the use of...

I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for...

Using spatial Poisson processes, we re-interpret the Imitation Dynamics and show how the spatial clustering of players affects both the selection of strategies and the speed by which they replicate. We find that the more clustered are the players, (a) the faster the evolution of strategies and...

We propose a learning dynamic with agents using samples of past play to estimate the distribution of other players' strategy choices and best responding to this estimate. To account for noisy play, estimated distributions over other players' strategy choices have full support in the other...