Rare and randomly occurring events are important features of the economic world. In continuous time they can easily be modeled by Poisson processes. Analyzing optimal behavior in such a setup requires the appropriate version of the change of variables formula and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman...

The present paper is concerned with the optimal control of stochastic differential equations, where uncertainty stems from one or more independent Poisson processes. Optimal behavior in such a setup (e.g., optimal consumption) is usually determined by employing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman...

Rare and randomly occurring events are important features of the economic world. In continuous time they can easily be modeled by Poisson processes. Analyzing optimal behavior in such a setup requires the appropriate version of the change of variables formula and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...

This paper is intended as a guide to building insurance risk (loss) models. A typical model for insurance risk, the so-called collective risk model, treats the aggregate loss as having a compound distribution with two main components: one characterizing the arrival of claims and another...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the...