In this paper, which is a continuation of a previous discrete time paper, we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game...

This paper studies a one-period stochastic game to determine the optimal premium strategies of non-life insurers in a competitive market. Specifically, the optimal premium strategy is determined by the Nash equilibrium of an n-player game, in which each player is assumed to maximise the expected...

This paper establishes a general analytical framework for continuous-time stochastic control problems for an ambiguity-averse agent (AAA) with time-inconsistent preference, where the control problems do not satisfy Bellman's principle of optimality. The AAA is concerned about model uncertainty...

In this paper, which is a continuation of the discrete time paper, we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game theoretic...

In this paper, which is a continuation of a previously published discrete time paper, we study a class of continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a...