This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …

cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized … hypothesized, we find that delegated punishment outperforms other punishment regimes, irrespective of the monitoring regime, both … to the baseline unless accompanied by a credible punishment. When combined with a punishment institution, both monitoring …

the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment …. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a … history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. …

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …

its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is …. Our model implies that (i) the probability of detection and the fine might be complements; (ii) the optimal monitoring … equilibrium and more stringent monitoring is costless, increasing the probability of detection might not be beneficial; and (iv …