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Optimal punishment for repeat offenders when the government can and cannot commit to sanctions

Emons, Winand - In: Frontiers in the economics of environmental regulation …, (pp. 155-171). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003355840

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - In: International review of law and economics 27 (2007) 2, pp. 170-178

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003568819

Subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand (contributor) - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002601605

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand (contributor) - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002604461

Subgame-perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 42 (2004) 3, pp. 496-502

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002141301

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001872430

Subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Emons, Winand - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424230

Social norms and legal design

Deffains, Bruno; Fluet, Claude - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980555

Reputational versus Beckerian Sanctions

Fluet, Claude; Mungan, Murat C. - 2020

Punishment causes reputational losses in addition to more tangible losses. Lowering the probability of punishment reduces these reputational losses by diluting the informational value of verdicts. These considerations better align the positive as well as normative implications of law enforcement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091075

Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers

Fluet, Claude; Friehe, Tim - In: Journal of public economic theory 26 (2024) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440835