We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the...

One of the most negative factors that characterize Italian economy and society is the pervasive and oppressive presence of organized crime, affecting many aspects of the daily live and every sector of business. The data unfortunately show how this phenomenon is increasingly growing and involves...

We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium...

In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The...

In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...

This is the General Report for the United States on the theme of “Surcharges and Penalties in Tax Law” for the 2015 meeting of the European Association of Tax Law Professors in Milan, Italy. The Report addresses questions relating to the treatment of civil penalties, criminal penalties and...

Very little is known about the efficient collection of fines despite their indispensable contribution to local government budgets. This paper fills an important gap in the literature by studying the effectiveness of deterrence (enforcement) and non-deterrence (social norms) letters that aim to...

Very little is known about the efficient collection of fines despite their indispensable contribution to local government budgets. This paper fills an important gap in the literature by studying the effectiveness of deterrence (enforcement) and non-deterrence (social norms) letters that aim to...

This paper extends the literature on tax amnesties by considering two special grace programmes. The first is an offer by the government not to investigate taxpayers' accounts, the second not to prosecute indicted evaders. I analyse the impact of both measures on the taxpayers' optimal behavior...