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In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004962203
In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631319
In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strate- gic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865966
We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103552